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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Vincent Stewart appeals from the district court's order revoking his 
probation and ordering his sentence executed. Stewart contends the district 
court (1) erred by revoking probation without transporting him to the revocation 
hearing; (2) abused its discretion by revoking probation; and (3) abused its 
discretion by failing to sua sponte reduce his sentence upon revocation. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Stewart was on probation when, during a home visit, his probation officer 
found him hiding in the basement. (R., p.9.) During a search of Stewart's home, 
law enforcement found paraphernalia used to smoke methamphetamine. (R., 
p.9.) Stewart admitted using one of the "methamphetamine smoking devices" to 
smoke methamphetamine. (R., p.9.) During a search incident to Stewart's 
arrest, an officer found a baggie in Stewart's sock, which contained a prescription 
anti-psychotic drug. (R., p.9.) 
The state charged Stewart with possession of methamphetamine. (R., 
pp.12-13, 19-20.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Stewart pied guilty to the 
possession charge and to domestic battery and petit theft in two other cases, and 
the state agreed to dismiss four pending misdemeanors and to recommend 
Mental Health Court. (R., pp.26-30.) On the possession charge, the court 
imposed a unified seven-year sentence with three years fixed and ordered it to 
run concurrent with the sentence in a separate Ada County case. (R., p.37.) 
The court, however, suspended the sentence and placed Stewart on probation 
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for four years. (R., pp.38-39.) Included among the special conditions of 
Stewart's probation was that he "attend and successfully graduate from the 
Canyon County Mental Health Court." (R., p.39.) 
Less than one month later, Stewart failed to appear for Mental Health 
Court and the court issued a warrant for his arrest. (R., p.40-43.) At his 
subsequent Mental Health Court appearance, the court ordered Stewart to 
continue attending Mental Health Court while out of custody pending the 
disposition of Stewart's other cases. (R., p.47.) Approximately three months 
later, the court entered a supplemental judgment that continued Stewart on 
probation with the Mental Health Court condition. (R., pp.56-58.) Less than two 
months after that, the court imposed SILO as a sanction for his failure to "call in" 
or "show up for Health and Wellness." (R., p.59.) Although Stewart completed 
the SILO requirement, he failed to appear for his next monthly Mental Health 
Court appearance. (R., pp.61-62.) Consequently, the court again issued a 
bench warrant for Stewart's arrest and, following his arrest, ordered him to serve 
14 days in jail. (R., pp.62-66.) Two months later, Stewart was "suspended from 
Mental Health Court for several violations of the rules." (R., p.69 (emphasis 
omitted).) 
As a result of Stewart's Mental Health Court suspension as well as an 
allegation that Stewart committed new crimes, on October 23, 2012, the state 
filed a Petition for Probation Violation. (R., pp.73-80.) Stewart admitted the 
alleged probation violations. (R., pp.98-100.) At the disposition hearing held on 
March 7, 2013, the court tentatively agreed to Stewart's request to continue in 
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Mental Health Court, stating, in relevant part: "I do not know if they'll take you 
back there, sir. I'm certainly recommending and giving you that opportunity. If 
they don't, then you'll be in violation of this program, and I'll have to do 
something differently." (Tr., p.17, Ls.4-8; see also R., p.119 (Order on Probation 
Violation).) 
On March 28, 2013, just two weeks after the disposition hearing, the state 
filed a Petition for Probation Violation alleging that, "on March 15, 2013, Mr. 
Stewart was denied as a participant in the Canyon County Mental Health Court 
program." (R., pp.120-123.) The court scheduled the matter for a "Review 
Hearing" on April 15, 2013, and counsel for Stewart filed a Motion to Transport 
Stewart to that hearing, which the court granted. (R., pp.124-127.) For reasons 
that are unclear, counsel for Stewart filed an identical Motion to Transport six 
days later; the court denied the second motion. (R., pp.128-131.) 
The Review Hearing was conducted on April 19, 2013. (R., p.132.) At the 
outset of that hearing, the court stated: 
This matter, Mr. Stewart previously appeared in front of this Court 
in March 2013. At that time the Court believed that Mr. Stewart, 
although he had been terminated from Mental Health Court was 
eligible for reinstatement and that in fact he could be reinstated. 
The Court then ordered he be continued on probation under the 
term and provision that he be reinstated to Mental Health Court. 
I now have been advised that Mental Health Court has 
chosen not to allow him to go back and obtain Mental Health Court 
and that further he had Ada County cases in which he's been 
sentenced to prison and would be unable to attend Mental Health 
Court in any event. 
Is that correct, [counsel]? 
(Tr., p.19, Ls.4-20.) 
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Defense counsel responded: "That's correct, Judge. He has been -- they 
have revoked over in Ada County as well. He's actually out at the prison right 
now." (Tr., p.19, Ls.21-24; also p.19, Ls.24-25 (court confirms with defense 
counsel that Stewart was in prison at that time).) The court then stated: 
At the prison. The Court declined to enter an order to transport him 
on the basis of Mr. Stewart's inability to complete the probation as 
ordered for reinstatement in Mental Health Court. The Court 
revokes his probation, that probation order, will impose a sentence 
of three years followed by an indeterminate four-year period of time 
for a total of seven years. 
(Tr., p.20, Ls.1-8.) 
Defense counsel inquired whether the judge would recommend the 
therapeutic community while Stewart was in custody, and the court agreed. (Tr., 
p.20, Ls.12-20.) Defense counsel made no other requests or objections at that 
time. (See generally Tr., pp.19-21.) 
On April 26, 2013, Stewart filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency in 
his sentence. (R., pp.139-141.) The court denied the motion. (R., pp.144-146.) 
Stewart filed a timely notice of appeal from the Judgment and the order denying 
his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.142-150.) 
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ISSUES 
Stewart states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Stewart's constitutional right to 
due process when it revoked Mr. Stewart's probation in his 
absence? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. 
Stewart's probation? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce 
Mr. Stewart's sentence, sua sponte, upon revoking his 
probation? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Stewart failed to show the district court erred in changing its 
disposition decision in Stewart's absence or in otherwise revoking his probation? 
2. Should this Court decline to consider Stewart's claim, raised for the first 
time on appeal, that the district court erred in failing to sua sponte reduce 




Stewart Has Failed To Show Error In The Process By Which The Court Amended 
Stewart's Probation Violation Disposition Or In The Court's Decision To Revoke 
His Probation 
A. Introduction 
Stewart argues "the district court violated his constitutional right to due 
process when it revoked his probation outside his presence." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.6.) Stewart further asserts the court "abused its discretion when it revoked his 
probation." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Both of these arguments fail. The district 
court's decision to amend the disposition of Stewart's probation violations, which 
Stewart admitted, without transporting him to announce that amendment did not, 
on the facts of this case, violate Stewart's constitutional rights. Nor has Stewart 
shown the court abused its discretion by revoking his probation given Stewart's 
failure to comply with the fundamental condition of continuing him on probation -
that he attend and complete Mental Health Court. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v. 
Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378,381,870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
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C. The Court's Decision To Amend Its Disposition Of Stewart's Probation 
Violation Without Transporting Stewart Was Not Unconstitutional And 
Stewart Has Otherwise Failed To Show Error In The Court's Revocation 
Decision 
In State v. Done, 139 Idaho 635, 637, 84 P.3d 571, 573 (Ct. App. 2003), 
the Court summarized the due process standards applicable to probation 
revocation decisions as follows: 
[B]efore probation can be revoked, a probationer must be given a 
due process hearing. Throughout probation revocation 
proceedings, the probationer is entitled to due process. The 
probationer is entitled to be present at the hearing and may be 
entitled to counsel. The probationer must be afforded the 
opportunity to be present and rebut evidence and to call and cross-
examine witnesses. Prior to the hearing, the probationer must be 
given adequate notice of the grounds for revocation. 
Stewart's due process rights were satisfied in relation to the allegation that 
he violated his probation by being suspended from Mental Health Court. The 
state's original Petition for Probation Violation on this basis was filed on October 
23, 2012. (R., pp.73-77.) At the December 19, 2012 evidentiary hearing 
scheduled in relation to the state's petition, Stewart admitted the allegations in 
the petition, including the allegation that reads, in relevant part: "on October 17, 
2012, Mr. Stewart was suspended from the Canyon County Mental Health Court 
program for program non-compliance." (R., pp. 76, 98-99.) Prior to the 
disposition hearing, Stewart explored the possibility of going back to Mental 
Health Court "pending court approval and the outcome of [a] 19-2524 Mental 
Health Evaluation." (R., pp.107-108.) Consistent with those efforts, Stewart filed 
a motion for a mental health evaluation, which the district court granted. (R., 
pp.111-114.) However, that evaluation was not provided to the court prior to 
7 
disposition. (Tr., p.6, Ls.18-19.) Nevertheless, defense counsel asked the court 
to consider allowing Stewart to continue participating in Mental Health Court, 
arguing: 
He's learned a lot from Mental Health Court and wants to 
continue to do the option of continuing on. And I do believe that 
that is a viable option for him. I know that whether or not he gets 
accepted back in is, you know, determined by their vote and what 
this Court decides to do today as well. But Judge, we would ask 
the Court to consider placing my client back into Mental Health 
Court. 
(Tr., p.9, Ls.8-16.) Stewart also urged the court to allow him the opportunity to 
complete Mental Health Court. (Tr., p.10, L.23- p.13, L.14.) 
The court responded: 
Mr. Stewart, you having admitted violating your probation, I 
do find that you are in violation of your probation. I am going to 
impose the sentence previously suspended of three fixed followed 
by four indeterminate for a total of seven years. I will suspend the 
execution of that sentence and place you back on probation on 
terms, same terms and conditions previously imposed, which 
includes successful completion of the Mental Health Court program. 
I do not know if they'll take you back there, sir. I'm 
certainly recommending and giving you that opportunity. If 
they don't, then you'll be in violation of this program, and I'll 
have to do something differently. 
(Tr., p.16, L.19-p.17, L.8 (emphasis added).) 
Upon being notified that Stewart was not eligible for reinstatement to 
Mental Health Court, the court did precisely what it told Stewart it would have to 
do at the disposition hearing - "something different[]" - that something different 
being the only real option, revocation, given that any type of probation would be 
effectively meaningless since, by that time, Stewart was in prison on other 
charges. (See Tr., p.19, Ls.14-25.) 
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Although the state filed a second Petition for Probation Violation upon 
being notified of Stewart's non-acceptance back into Mental Health Court, the 
April 19, 2013 hearing was not an adjudication of that petition as much as it was 
a continuation of the March 7, 2013 disposition, since the disposition 
contemplated on that date could not be given effect. The practical reality, 
therefore, is that Stewart was given notice and an opportunity to be heard, i.e., 
due process, on both whether he violated his probation and on the disposition of 
that violation having been present at the adjudication hearing, where he pied 
guilty, the original disposition on March 7, 2013, and, through counsel at the April 
19, 2013 hearing. Stewart has made no reasoned argument explaining how, on 
the facts of this case, he was deprived of meaningful notice and an opportunity to 
be heard on whether he violated his probation, which he admitted, or whether his 
probation should be revoked - especially given the lack of any viable alternatives 
to revocation. Cf. State v. Iverson, 155 Idaho 766, _, 316 P.3d 682, 693 (Ct. 
App. 2014) (noting "[d]ue process demands an opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" and requiring a showing of 
prejudice); State v. Crockett, 151 Idaho 674, 679, 263 P.3d 139, 144 (Ct. App. 
2011) (in the context of a due process claim relating to dismissing and refilling 
charges, court notes the "prejudice component of the due process inquiry 
requires that a defendant show actual prejudice affecting his or her ability to 
mount or present a defense"). 
Instead, Stewart shifts his argument from the claimed due process 
violation, which is based purely on his absence from the April 19, 2013, without 
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any explanation as to how his presence would or could have changed the 
disposition, to a secondary argument that revocation was improper because he 
"did not admit to violating his probation" and his failure to gain "re-entry" into 
Mental Health Court was not willful. (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) This argument 
misses the point because it ignores the actual proceedings in this case. The 
court did not "find" that Stewart violated his probation "by being denied re-entry" 
into Mental Health Court. The court's amended disposition did not involve a 
finding of a new violation, it was a continuation of the March 7, 2013 disposition 
This view is consistent with the court's characterization of the April 19, 2013 
hearing as a "Review Hearing" - a characterization to which Stewart did not 
object. Indeed, although counsel for Stewart sought to have Stewart transported 
to the Review Hearing, at no time did he notify the district court of any desire to 
proceed as if the court were considering a new violation. 1 On the facts of this 
case, this Court should not endorse Stewart's efforts to do so for the first time on 
appeal.2 
Even if the Court considers Stewart's claim that his failure to gain "re-
entry" into Mental Health Court was not a willful violation, the claim fails. It is 
readily apparent that Mental Health Court was a fundamental condition of 
1 It is likely defense counsel did not make any such objection because he 
recognized it would not benefit Stewart to remain on probation in this case while 
in prison on another case, which would preclude Stewart from receiving credit for 
time served on his current sentence in this case. 
2 To the extent this Court concludes Stewart's inability to be placed back into 
Mental Health Court as contemplated by the March 7, 2013 disposition was a 
separate probation violation that should have been treated as such, the state 
concedes the standard due process protections were not satisfied as there was 
no separate arraignment or adjudication of that alleged violation. 
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Stewart's probation and the court's willingness to continue him on probation was 
premised on Stewart being accepted back into Mental Health Court. Stewart's 
counsel plainly acknowledged that Stewart could not continue in Mental Health 
Court and, as the district court noted at the April 19, 2013 hearing (and counsel 
agreed), Stewart "would be unable to attend Mental Health Court in any event" 
because he was "sentenced to prison" in his Ada County cases. (Tr., p.17, 
Ls.14-19.) "After sound determination that a probationer could not possibly 
perform a fundamental condition of his probation, the judge has discretion to 
remove probation and pronounce sentence." State v. Oyler, 92 Idaho 43, 47, 
436 P.2d 709, 713 (1968). That is precisely the determination the district court 
made in this case and Stewart has failed to show that determination was 
erroneous. Not only was Stewart unable to comply with a fundamental condition 
of his probation, his probation was clearly not consistent with the protection of 
society as he continued to commit new crimes during his probationary term. See 
State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho 506, 510, 903 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 1995) ('The 
purpose of probation is rehabilitation" and any cause satisfactory to the court that 
probation is not meeting its goals, is sufficient to justify revocation.); State v. 
Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001) ("In deciding 
whether revocation of probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the 
court considers whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and 
whether continued probation is consistent with protection of society."). The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Stewart's probation. 
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11. 
Stewart's Claim That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Sua Sponte 
Reducing His Sentence Upon Revocation Is Not Preserved For Appeal 
Stewart asserts the district court abused its discretion when it failed to sua 
sponte reduce his sentence upon revoking probation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-
16.) Although Stewart actually filed a Rule 35 motion, which the district court 
denied, he does not seek review of that decision, instead challenging the district 
court's failure to sua sponte reduce the sentence it later expressly stated should 
not be reduced. Stewart's chosen tactic for challenging his sentence is not 
preserved for appeal and he cannot obtain review of this claim under the 
fundamental error doctrine because he cannot satisfy the first prong of the 
fundamental error analysis - a constitutional violation - because his claim is 
based on an alleged rule violation. State v. Clontz, 2014 WL 2119164 (Idaho 
App. 2014). Stewart's sentencing argument, therefore, fails. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order revoking Stewart's probation and ordering his sentence executed. 
DATED this 3rd day of June, 2014. 
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(Depu y Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of June, 2014, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
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SALLY J. COOLEY 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
ty Attorney General 
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